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LETTER DATED 21 MAY 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government I wish to transmit herewith a letter dated 21 May 1992 from Mr. Ahmad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the decisions to demarcate the land boundary between Iraq and Kuwait adopted by the Commission you appointed in connection with that boundary.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abd al-Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Letter dated 21 May 1992 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

You are, no doubt, aware of the decisions of your appointed Commission on the subject of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary-line, which were adopted on 14 April 1992, during the Commission's fifth session in New York, and upon which the boundary demarcation is to be based.

On this occasion I would like to elucidate to you the viewpoint of the Government of Iraq regarding this matter which, in view of its vital importance, is serious not only to Iraq's interests, but also to the common interests, be it in our Arab region or the other regions in the world that witness international disputes regarding boundaries.

First, before anything else, I would like to refer to my letter to Your Excellency of 6 April 1991, regarding the Government of Iraq's position on Security Council resolution 687 (1991), adopted by the Council on 4 April 1991 (S/22456). I dealt in the first section of my letter with what was specified in the aforementioned resolution with regard to the subject of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. In this respect I stated in my letter the following:

> "While in its preamble, the resolution reaffirms that Iraq is an independent sovereign State, the fact remains that a good number of its iniquitous provisions impair that sovereignty. In fact, the resolution constitutes an unprecedented assault on the sovereignty, and the rights that stem therefrom, embodied in the Charter and in international law and practice. For example, where the question of boundaries is concerned, the Security Council has determined in advance the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait. And yet it is well known, from the juridical and practical standpoint, that in international relations boundary issues must be the subject of an agreement between States, since this is the only basis capable of guaranteeing the stability of frontiers.
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> "Moreover, the resolution fails to take into account Iraq's view, which is well known to the Council, that the provisions relating to the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait contained in the "Agreed Minutes between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters" dated 4 October 1963 have not yet been subjected to the constitutional procedures required for ratification of the Agreed Minutes by the legislative branch and the President of Iraq, thus leaving the question of the boundary pending and unresolved. The Council has nevertheless imposed on Iraq a boundary with Kuwait. By acting in this strange manner, the Council itself has also violated one of the provisions of resolution 660, which served as the basis for its subsequent resolutions. In its paragraph 3, resolution 660 calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to resolve their differences through

negotiation, and the question of the boundary is well known to be one of the main differences. Iraq officially informed the Council that it accepted resolution 660 and was prepared to apply it, but the Council has gone beyond this legal position, contradicting its previous resolutions, and adopted an iniquitous resolution which imposes on Iraq, an independent and sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations, new conditions and a situation which deprives it of its right to establish its territorial rights in accordance with the principles of international law. Thus the Council is also depriving Iraq of its right to exercise its free choice and to affirm that it accepts the boundary without reservation. Where the question of the boundary is concerned, the Council resolution is an iniquitous resolution which constitutes a dangerous precedent, a first in the annals of the international Organization and - as some impartial members of the Council indicated in their Statements when the resolution was voted on - an assault on the sovereignty of States.

"It is also to be noted that the United States of America, the author of the original draft resolution on which resolution 687, which imposes a solution to the boundary and other differences between Iraq and Kuwait, was based, refuses to impose any solution whatsoever on its ally, Israel, in accordance with conventions, United Nations resolutions and international law.

"Furthermore, the United States of America is preventing the Security Council from assuming the responsibilities incumbent upon it with respect to the Arab-Zionist conflict, the Israeli policy of annexation of the occupied Arab territories, the establishment of settlements, the displacement of populations and the disregard for the rights of the Palestinian people and the neighbouring Arab countries, by vetoing any draft resolution approved by the remaining members of the Council, for the simple reason that Israel does not want a resolution which favours a just settlement of the conflict."

Second, in paragraph 3 of resolution 687 (1991), the Security Council called upon the Secretary-General "to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month;". In accordance with this, the Secretary-General prepared a draft report which was presented by the Legal Counsel of the United Nations Secretariat to Iraq's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York during a meeting that was held between them on 17 April 1991, asking him to present the Iraqi Government's opinion. We have presented our remarks in my letter dated 23 April 1991 (S/22558, annex II, enclosure), and which can be summed up in the following points:

1. The unavailability of any legal basis for the Security Council's consideration of the map attached to document S/22412 dated 28 March 1991 upon a request from the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland amongst the appropriate material which the process of demarcation depends upon. The Iraqi Government has not been a party in the drawing of the said map; also, it has not recognized it and there is no evidence of such recognition. On this basis, the consideration of this map amongst the materials upon which the process of the demarcation depends is tantamount to an arbitrary imposition from a single party on the will of Iraq, which is a sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations. It is also a preconceived judgement on the course of the border line on the ground before any commission has embarked on the process of boundary demarcation.

2. Lending assistance from the Secretary-General for laying down measures to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait must offer complete balance between the extremes any of the two parties might go to in the course of implementing the demarcation process, and provide for the solution of disputes that might arise between them in their technical positions, a method which ensures justice and fairness. From this standpoint, we observed that the composition of the Commission that was proposed by the Secretary-General for implementing the process of demarcation could not render justice and fairness and in particular, in the light of what is explained in section 1 above. The Secretary-General had proposed that the Commission be composed of five members, two representing Iraq and Kuwait and three independent experts chosen by the Secretary-General who appoints one of them as Chairman of the Commission. The Secretary-General also suggested that the Commission's decisions be taken by a majority vote. Nevertheless, the Government of Iraq expressed at the same time its belief that, as long as it would not have any role in the choice of the said experts, then it would not be able to confirm in advance the fact of their independence; hence its opinion in the course of the demarcation process would be represented by a single member only, out of five members.

3. In addition to what was provided in resolution 687 (1991) about the basis upon which the process of demarcation depends, the Secretary-General's draft report provided other bases that were expressed in a vague and undetermined manner. The draft report mentioned that the Commission could utilize "appropriate technology" and that the Commission would "make the necessary arrangements for the identification and examination of appropriate material relevant to the demarcation of the boundary". It is for this reason that Iraq had requested the elucidation of these concepts because it would help to minimize the possibilities of dispute in the future when the Commission embarked on its work.

4. The Secretary-General's draft report imposed upon Iraq half the expenses of the demarcation process. This prompted the Government of Iraq to question the basis of this opinion as long as the overall content of the suggestions, provided in the draft report, seemed to be almost a "contract of adhesion" in which Iraq had no free will to agree consensually on its content. It was proposed that Iraq bear half the expenses of the demarcation process without having any consideration for its opinion in the overall boundary process, whether in its delimitation or in its demarcation. From this standpoint the Iraqi Government did not find any justification on the

basis of the rules of justice and fairness to bear any expenses of a process which was imposed upon it.

It is worth mentioning that the Government of Iraq had assured the Secretary-General of its full readiness for consultations regarding its stated remarks, whether it be in New York or any other place. It had also been indicated that, like Iraq's acceptance of resolution 687 (1991), in spite of its objections to it and its criticism of its contents, the Iraqi Government would cooperate with the Secretary-General and would nominate its representative in the Demarcation Commission even if the Secretary-General did not take into consideration the remarks and views of the Iraqi Government owing to the continuation of the same circumstances which imposed acceptance upon Iraq.

The Secretary-General replied in his letter, dated 30 April 1991 (S/22558, annex III), to the remarks and views of Iraq. He relied in his reply on the text of resolution 687 (1991) regarding the basis of demarcation as if they were unknown to Iraq, and he expressed to Iraq his assurances that he would be keen to guarantee the independence of the experts. He referred to the Demarcation Commission the task of interpreting some of the vague concepts of the demarcation bases on the pretext that his interpretation would affect the independence of the Commission's work. He stated that Iraq's participation in the Commission would enable the Iraqi Government to express its views, hence it had to bear half the expenses of the demarcation process. The Secretary-General did not target, with such replies, the substantive issue of Iraq's remarks and views, the point of which had been to hope that the Secretary-General would seek, in the light of the imposition by the Security Council resolution of a boundary delimitation formula between Iraq and Kuwait and the basis of the boundary demarcation process, to ensure justice and fairness throughout by the achievement of balance and equality between the positions of the two parties in some very vital aspects, namely, the method of the Commission's composition, the manner of carrying out its technical task, the method of taking its decisions, the nature of the said decisions and their characteristics, and other important matters. For that matter the Iraqi Government had called for consultations, a call which was totally ignored by the Secretary-General after he had submitted his draft report, without any alterations, to the Security Council in document S/22558 dated 2 May 1991. Yet, in spite of all this Iraq participated in the Commission's work.

Third, as you know, the Commission held its first session in New York on 23 and 24 May 1991. During that session, which dealt with organizational matters, the Commission decided that its work was "technical and not political" and that the nature of the task entrusted to it related solely to "the demarcation of the boundary". It requested the two independent experts Mr. Ian Brook (Sweden) and Mr. William Robertson (New Zealand) to present a plan of work during the next session.

The second session was held in Geneva from 2 to 12 July 1991. The two independent experts presented in that session a "discussion paper", which contained, as they put it, background information on the interpretation of the

boundary demarcation which could be considered as the starting-point in the discussions of the Commission.

As you are aware, the Commission adopted during that session a number of crucial decisions, both substantive and technical, by which it settled the fundamental bases of what was to be the course of the land boundary. This was done in an atmosphere distinguished by a number of characteristics that cannot be overlooked by any fair and objective observer. Permit me to take one example of the manner in which the Commission reached one of its major decisions on substance, namely the one relating to the creation of a turning-point at Safwan, a point which controlled the overall course of what was called the northern frontier in the direction towards the east. The two independent experts relied in their interpretation of the said direction on cartographic considerations based fundamentally on British correspondence and maps going back to the period when Britain was the dominating colonial Power in the region. In their attempt to substantiate their viewpoint, the two experts referred to some Iraqi maps in order to prove the existence of Iraqi concepts of the boundary despite the fact that the maps presented contained explicitly a disclaimer which has the effect of negating any recognition, implied acceptance or acquiescence in regard to demarcation. The two experts also sought to substantiate their viewpoint on the Iraqi concept of demarcation by relying on an Iraqi diplomatic note going back to June 1940, which related to the position of the noticeboard placed by the British south of Safwan, and on an Iraqi proposal relating to the demarcation of the boundary between Safwan and the sea which entailed an amendment of a formula called the delimitation formula of 1932. This was done, although everybody knows that Iraq has never accepted any formula relating to demarcation, whether British or otherwise, and that Britain had rejected the Iraqi note of 1940, and that it had marred the Iraqi proposal of 1955, which Kuwait rejected. In response to the views of the experts in this connection, the representative of Iraq, for example, pointed out that in the creation of a turning-point on the course of the so-called boundary at Safwan the two experts failed to look precisely at the formula in the 1932 document; they simply concentrated their attention on maps. It is clear from the said formula that Safwan was mentioned twice: once as "south of the latitude of Safwan" to describe the terminal point of the boundary line in the western area in Wadi al-Batin only and for no other purpose, and the second as "passing south of the Safwan Wells" to describe the course of the boundary line eastward from the point at al-Batin to the point of intersection between Khowr Abd Allah and Khowr Zhobeir. It is very clear, therefore, that the turning-point at Safwan was created without any justification. The representative of Iraq also pointed out in this regard that depending purely on a cartographic point of view on the question would present an incomplete picture of the appropriate material. To substantiate this point, the representative of Iraq requested the Commission to look into the factual phenomena of territorial encroachment by the Kuwaiti authorities in a northward direction after 1963. This was achieved by moving border posts, border police and oil excavation sites and the establishment of agricultural plantations. All these acts were protested by Iraqi notes presented through official channels. All those notes referred to the "area of the border" and

not to a specific line. The representative of Iraq showed the Commission a compilation of documents which represented photocopies of passports that used to be stamped at a site fixed by the Kuwaiti authorities at "al-Mitla'a" in the 1960s, and which moved to the north more than 70 kilometres. The representative of Iraq stated that a translation of those documents and notes would be made in order to present them to the Commission. He noted that Iraq had not presented them at that session of the Commission as it was not possible to know what needed to be presented before looking at the report of the two experts; and so he requested the Commission to make the time available for that. In this connection, the representative of Iraq recalled that, during the visit carried out by the Commission to the area separating Iraq and Kuwait in June 1991, he had pointed out that the Commission should grant its members ample opportunity to carry out precise research in archives and libraries in order to do a clean and honest job.

I have referred above in a concentrated fashion to the manner in which the Commission has dealt with one fundamental point among those relating to the course of the border as an example in order to clarify the picture of how the material known as "appropriate material" was handled. Actually, what I stated in regard to this point applies also to all others. The fact is that the Commission, instead of being patient in deciding upon matters and waiting for the presentation of the documents and notes referred to by the representative of Iraq, prevented all that by adopting in clear haste substantive technical decisions in regard to the demarcation of the so-called land boundary. This was done under the influence of clear pressure from the representative of the rulers of Kuwait. The decisions came successively one after another through a steam-rolling process led by the representative of Kuwait in full harmony with the two experts. The said representative addressed leading questions which ended with proposals for a vote, some of which were formulated in consultations between him and the two experts. Hence, the Commission did not pay attention to the correct application of the rules of procedure, neither did it pay any attention to the interrelated nature of the substance of the questions to be decided upon, with the result that the one decision negatively affected the substance of the following decision. In addition, the decisions of the Commission far exceeded the bounds of the recommendations presented by the two experts.

Moreover, the decisions were adopted in full contradiction with the delimitation formula. The haste in the adoption of the substantive and technical decisions during the second session was justified by the pretext that the report of the Secretary-General had stated that the demarcation should be achieved as soon as possible in order to promote stability and peace and security along the border (S/22558, para. 4). But in fact the Commission had ended up with one-sided decisions both in source and in substance. Here again emerges another fundamental fact, which cannot be overlooked. The question of the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait was thought of, initiated and set in motion along preconceived lines in order to end with options imposed upon Iraq whether in regard to delimitation or demarcation of the boundary without any regard to Iraq's interests and all the historical facts which support them. In doing so, no room was left for rendering justice and equity

to Iraq's territorial interests. Security Council resolution 687 (1991) imposed the delimitation formula and the pursuit in a preconceived manner of demarcation by interposing the concept of the appropriate material and the consideration of a British map as included in such material. Then came the report of the Secretary-General to complete the preconceived imposition through the manner chosen for the composition of the Commission, the method of adopting its decisions and the addition of further points for the demarcation process when the Commission was constrained to demarcate the international boundary in geographical coordinates of latitude and longitude. All this led a priori to the adoption of pure cartographic evidence without leaving any possibility for the presentation of any other evidence drawn from other appropriate material.

It is worth noting that the Commission could not consider for lack of time the question of intersection of Khowr Abd Allah with Khowr Zhobeir, which represents the eastern point of the boundary line. This question was taken up by the Commission during its third session held in Geneva from 12 to 16 August 1991. In this connection, the two independent experts opted for the view that the determination of the position of the intersection should be made in the epoch of 1932 as that was the period in which the exchange of letters had taken place. This view was supported by the Chairman.

What should not be overlooked is that the Commission has reached that conclusion after prolonged discussions, which seem to have been prompted by the desire to placate, and show courtesy to, the representative of Kuwait at the expense of full adherence to the rules of procedure. The said representative sought to achieve two objectives. The first was to determine the position of the point in question as it is today in order to deprive Iraq of its historic rights in the waters of the intersection of the Khowrs. The second objective was to push the Commission into demarcating the maritime boundary in Khowr Abd Allah despite the fact that the mandate of the Commission did not include that. At any rate, this second objective still stands, for the Commission granted the representative of the Kuwaiti authorities the opportunity to present the subject again in its fifth session held in New York from 8 to 16 April 1992 and decided to continue with its consideration at its next session.

After the Commission had adopted its decisions in regard to the fundamental points of demarcation of the land boundary, the technical criteria for the operation of demarcation and the technical measures to be carried out in the field, the experts went on to implement those decisions during the period falling between the third and fifth sessions of the Commission. As you know, the Commission decided upon the land boundary line at its fifth session held in New York recently. In this connection, it is necessary to record some essential facts.

In implementing a technical decision adopted by the Commission at its second session, the two independent experts investigated the position of a turning-point of what was called the boundary at Safwan in a manner that flatly contradicted the substance of the said decision. The decision of the

Commission, which was adopted on 11 July 1991, authorized the experts to conduct investigations and collect information necessary to enable the Commission to decide upon the northern boundary precisely. It emerged during the fifth session of the Commission that the representative of Kuwait and his experts had accompanied the independent experts in their investigations in the area of Safwan contrary to the decision of the Commission. As is clear from the discussion raised by the representative of Iraq on the question at the 33rd meeting of the Commission, the representative of Iraq was informed of this after the investigation had been carried out, and he had in fact objected to the idea on the basis of the decision of the Commission as soon as he was informed of it.

It is also clear that the experts did not only accompany the representative of the authorities in Kuwait and his experts to witness the determination of the position of the turning-point at Safwan but also they had relied on the opinion of the Kuwaiti experts in addition to the British sources. Accordingly, the representative of the Kuwaiti authorities participated in the determination of the position of the point at Safwan in the field despite the fact that he is a party with a direct interest in the question and that the decision of the Commission did not authorize anyone to proceed along those lines, in which the representative of Iraq was tricked contrary to the principles of ethics and good faith.

The turning-point for the land boundary at Safwan was created contrary to what was stated in the text of the delimitation formula in the 1932 document as we explained simply because the British officials had decided during the period of their colonial authority in the area to demarcate that point. The experts had taken an Iraqi note of 1941 as a starting-point in the creation of the point in question despite the fact that the successive Iraqi Governments have not agreed at all to any formula to demarcate the boundary as we explained.

It is worth noting that the experts of the Commission were not content to rely only on the British sources in demarcating the boundary from that point to the west and east, on the basis that the said demarcation is dictated by the cartographic and the technical nature of the task entrusted to the Commission, as the Commission itself had emphasized on many occasions since its first session. This is because the state of the deliberations of the Commission clearly indicates the contrary, as, at the 34th meeting, the experts expressed their opinion on the necessary force to be given to evidence relating to occupation when they carried out the demarcation. The Commission approved what the experts opted for, which resulted in seizing very large areas of Iraqi territory fully acknowledged to be so before with all that it contains of the oil resources which were not unknown to the British colonialists who used to control the region. Iraqi citizens were deprived of their homes and plantations, which constitute their source of income and which they have inherited from generation to generation throughout history. This is in addition to depriving Iraq of numerous installations and of any meaningful access to the sea. As for the position of the oil wells, the Kuwaiti authorities themselves acknowledged their trespass thereon through

Saad al Abdullah during the meeting with the Deputy Chairman of the Revolution Command Council of Iraq held in Jeddah on 30 July 1990.

There is yet another fundamental fact which should be recorded for history. The work of the Commission, and the speed with which it adopted its decisions in regard to demarcation, was not immune from interference by the Secretariat. All the members of the Commission are fully aware of the fact that the Senior Political Adviser to the Secretary-General, Mr. Alvaro de Soto, called in the Chairman of the Commission, its two experts and its Secretary in the morning of 13 April 1992 and pressed them to complete the work speedily and without hesitation. This uncalled-for interference was prompted by a request from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations. Some quarters may imagine that this intervention was in harmony with what was stated in the report of the Secretary-General that the Commission was responsible in the conduct of its work to the Secretary-General (S/22558, para. 6). If this is so, such an imagination is not well-founded, because the Commission is not only composed of the Chairman and the two independent experts but also includes in addition a representative of each of the parties.

One of the striking facts relating to the results of the work of the Commission is that the United Nations Commission came out with a boundary line on the basis of British sources and interpretations which is worse for Iraq's interests than the British line drawn on the basis of the same sources and interpretations on the British map (S/22412) referred to in Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and which successive Iraqi Governments did not recognize.

Fourth, the results which the Commission reached contradict the facts of history and geography.

Iraq is known to have always been a political entity and the seat of more than one civilization throughout history. It is a fact known for millenia. Throughout its long history, Iraq has always been a coastal State and a major trading centre. The small village established some two centuries ago on the banks of the Arabian Gulf under the name of "Kuwait", an Iraqi term for "a small settlement of people", remained throughout the nineteenth century and up to the First World War an Iraqi Qadhaa' (district) belonging to the Province of Basrah. Under Ottoman administrative law, Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq, subject to the Province of Basrah.

In 1897, the Governor of Basrah, Muhsin Pasha, informed the Sheikh of Kuwait, Mubarak al-Sabah, of the Sultan's decree appointing him as Qa'im-Maqam (District Administrator) of the Qadhaa' of Kuwait, a district of the Province of Basrah. By then, Mubarak had been instigated by the British to kill his two older brothers, Muhammad and Jarrah, who had opposed the British plan to turn Kuwait into an entity under British dominance.

In 1899, Britain goaded Mubarak al-Sabah into signing a secret agreement under which the British were to provide him with protection even though he was a vassal of the Ottoman Empire and, accordingly, had no authority to sign any

international accord. The agreement was therefore strongly rejected by the Ottoman Sultan, who forced Mubarak to retreat and declare his allegiance and subordination to the Ottoman State in 1901.

Britain never ceased these attempts, but continued to establish bases in various parts of the Arabian Gulf in order to consolidate its colonial grip over this region, the strategic importance of which had increased both militarily and politically, within the framework of the competition with the Ottoman Empire, and economically as it constituted an important trade route and was known by the British to contain vast oil reserves. In order to secure the interests of the British Empire by weakening all major States in the region, Britain focused its influence on Kuwait and drew artificial boundaries as they did later, together with their French ally, in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. By so doing Britain perniciously severed a part of Iraq in a manner that deprived a country, ancient in its civilization and great in its land and population, of its natural access to the waters of the Arabian Gulf, the access which it had possessed throughout history.

Since its establishment in 1921, the State of Iraq has refused to recognize what had emanated from this British colonial deed. All successive Iraqi Governments continued to demand the return of this severed part of Iraq and that historical and geographical justice be done to Iraq to guarantee its commercial and economic interests and provide it with the requirements necessary for the defence of its national security. This was the position adopted by successive Iraqi Governments, despite the fact that the Iraqi regime at the time was closely linked to Britain.

Then Britain consistently pressurized Iraq into accepting the fait accompli. When the British Government forced the Prime Minister of Iraq in 1932 to exchange letters with the British Commissioner in Baghdad regarding the demarcation of the boundaries on the basis of the draft agreement proposed between the Ottoman and the British Governments, which had remained unratified because of the outbreak of war, the Iraqi House of Representatives refused, in its capacity as the country's legislative authority in accordance with the Constitution, to ratify the said letters.

During the 1930s, popular demand in Iraq and Kuwait for the return of Kuwait to Iraq increased. The national press adopted those demands and supported them with articles and historical documents affirming this call. The British Political Agent in Kuwait, Colonel Dickson, warned, in his letters to the British Political Resident in the Gulf, in 1933, against rapprochement and called for the separation of the people of Kuwait from the people of Iraq.

In 1940, the ruler of Kuwait replaced the Iraqi administration of the post office in Kuwait with British staff. In 1945, the Iraqi school curricula applied in Kuwaiti schools were replaced by Egyptian curricula.

King Ghazi, the second monarch of Iraq, supported enthusiastically the necessity of the unification of Kuwait with Iraq. He expressed his desire to visit Kuwait. Britain, however, did not encourage the visit and endeavoured to prevent Iraq and Kuwait from reaching any agreement.

In April 1938, Mr. Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, Iraq's then Foreign Minister, informed the British Ambassador in Baghdad, Mr. Peterson, that:

> "The Anglo-Ottoman Agreement of 1913 had recognized Kuwait as a district belonging to the Province of Basrah, and since sovereignty over Basrah had been transferred from the Ottomans to the State of Iraq, then that sovereignty should include Kuwait as provided for in the agreement of 1913. Iraq, therefore, does not recognize any change in the status of Kuwait".

In Kuwait the Kuwaiti youth took an active part in the call for Kuwait's return to Iraq.

In May 1938, a group of "free Kuwaitis" submitted a petition to the Iraqi Government inviting Iraq to help them to achieve their aspirations regarding the return of Kuwait to Iraq. To this end, a "national coalition" was established to call upon Ahmed al-Sabah, the then Sheikh of Kuwait, to set up a legislative Council representing the free people of Kuwait. He was forced to agree to this demand. During the first session of the said Council in 1938, the members expressed their demand for the return of Kuwait to Iraq. The Council's demand displeased the ruler of Kuwait and he dissolved the Council on 21 December 1938, and waged a campaign of arrests and oppression against its members.

Nevertheless, the free people of Kuwait continued to demand the return of Kuwait to Iraq. They sent many telegrams to petition King Ghazi. One of those telegrams, which was broadcast on Baghdad radio on 7 March 1939, called upon King Ghazi to intervene, saying:

> "Our history confirms the integration of Kuwait with Iraq. We shall live and die under the Iraqi flag. Ghazi! Help your brothers in Kuwait!".

The situation escalated into a sweeping uprising led by the youth of Kuwait against the authorities on 10 March 1939. The ruler of Kuwait had to resort to armed force to disperse the youth, a great number of whom he then arrested and imprisoned.

King Ghazi tried to intervene to secure the release of the prisoners. He warned the Sheikh of Kuwait against the continued harassment of the free Kuwaitis.

King Ghazi and the then Iraqi Government were subjected to intense British pressure to desist from Iraqi demands for the return of Kuwait. To this end, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, Mr. Peterson, had several secret meetings with King Ghazi before the latter's death, in an attempt to press him

to give up the claims to Kuwait. A short while afterwards King Ghazi was killed in a mysterious accident on the night of 5 April 1939, giving every reason to believe that Britain was actually behind his death because of his strong advocacy for the return of Kuwait to Iraq.

Following the assassination of King Ghazi, Britain's collaborators seized power in the country. With the outbreak of the Second World War and the following years, Iraq and the region witnessed a series of successive events and changes, among which the creation of Israel, the Arab-Israeli war and the revolution in Egypt. This gave the British colonialists the pretext to concentrate their influence in Kuwait, severing its political and human links with Iraq.

On 9 March 1956, while Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, was on a visit to Baghdad attending a consultative meeting of the Permanent Council of the Baghdad Pact, Prime Minister Nouri al-Said of Iraq raised the subject of accession of Kuwait to the Arab Union which was intended to be formed between Iraq and Jordan. Lloyd promised to put the matter before the British Cabinet. Britain's reply, which was delivered through the British Ambassador in Baghdad, Michael Wright, was that Britain was prepared to grant Kuwait independence and Kuwait would have the freedom to decide the question of joining the Union. In order to present Britain with a fait accompli, Iraq dispatched the then Deputy Prime Minister Tawfiq al-Suwaidi in April 1957 to Shtoora in Lebanon, where Sheikh Abdullah al-Salim al-Sabah was staying, in order to negotiate with him about the necessity of Kuwait's accession to the expected Union. That effort, however, did not produce any positive result.

Early in 1958, Prime Minister Nouri al-Said of Iraq submitted to the Baghdad Pact the necessity of the integration of Kuwait with Iraq, at a meeting attended by the representatives of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Britain along with United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who attended the meeting as an observer. No success was achieved at that meeting owing to the British opposing position.

Following the establishment of the Arab Union between Iraq and Jordan on 14 February 1958, King Faisal II, joined by Prime Minister Nouri al-Said and the Foreign Minister of the Union, Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, raised the issue of Kuwait's accession to the Arab Union with the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. The British, however, also rejected that.

When Abdullah al-Salim al-Sabah, Sheikh of Kuwait, visited Baghdad on 10 May 1958, King Faisal II and Prime Minister Nouri al-Said, raised with him the issue of Kuwait's accession to the Arab Union. The Sheikh of Kuwait responded by saying that he had to consult the British and seek their advice on the matter.

On 5 June 1958 the Government of the Union presented a confidential note to the British Embassy in Baghdad in which it presented the international status of Kuwait before the First World War by stating:

"The land of Kuwait had, from the point of view of international law, been under the sovereignty of the Ottoman State, as a qadhaa' (district) belonging to the province of Basrah. This sovereignty had never been subject to doubt or dispute from the point of view of either the local authorities in Kuwait or the British Government. Indeed, the latter had implicitly recognized this fact in the Anglo-Turkish Agreement signed in London on 29 July 1913 which stated, in article 6, the right of the Sheikh of Kuwait to exercise the administrative authority invested in him as an Ottoman district administrator subordinate to the Province of Basrah."

The note also presented Kuwait's international status after the war by stating:

"As a consequence of the settlements that were concluded after World War I, Turkey relinquished all the Arab provinces that were subordinated to the Ottoman State, amongst them the three provinces from which the Kingdom of Iraq was formulated, including the Basrah Province which Kuwait was one of its districts. But the international status of Kuwait remained vague during the period of British occupation of Iraq and Britain's assumption of Mandate on it and its practice of actual authority in the country.

"It is only natural in such circumstances that Iraq, who was not free to run its foreign affairs, be obliged to accept any arrangements or settlements decided by the British authority regarding Kuwait, in particular what concerns depriving Iraq from the territorial waters that belonged to the Province of Basrah during the Ottoman era. Before Iraq's accession to the membership of the League of Nations, the Iraqi Government raised with the British authorities the matter of boundaries between Iraq and Kuwait, demanding the return of the islands situated in the said territorial waters and the delimitation of the land boundary in a manner that is righteous and justifiable. Yet, it did not attain the achievement of its justifiable demands because the British Government had presented the text of an agreement signed between it and the Ottoman Government in 1913 which includes, among other things, articles concerning the protection of the Sheikh of Kuwait and the designation of Kuwait's current boundaries. Later on, it was found that this agreement had not been ratified and did not attain the legal status.

"Iraqi Government's last attempt to restore the islands situated in Iraq's territorial waters and the designation of land boundaries came when it approached the British Government during the Baghdad Pact negotiations and the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty when the matter of boundaries was discussed but they did not reach any result".

The note mentioned the importance of Kuwait for Iraq and Iraq's interest in putting an end to the widespread smuggling operations via Kuwait, and

"the addressing of the big trouble in securing peace in the southern regions bordering Kuwait because Kuwait had become a haven for escaped criminals not only from Iraq but from different nearby countries."

It also mentioned the necessity of finding a naval outlet for Iraq on the Arabian Gulf in order to avoid the economic damages that had been inflicted on Iraq. Finally, it mentioned the treatment of counter-Iraq activity after Kuwait became a centre for adverse propaganda aiming at the destabilization of Iraq's security. The note offered two suggestions: the first being the achievement of Kuwait's accession to the Arab Union established between Iraq and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The second was:

"If the British Government saw that accession cannot be achieved for the time being, then the Government of the Arab Union finds itself compelled to announce that all the islands existing in the territorial waters are within the boundaries of the Arab Union, and that the land border line between the Arab Union and Kuwait starts from the meeting point of al-Oja valley with al-Batin valley and heads eastwards in a direct line until it reaches al-Jahra on the sea of Kuwait's Gulf provided it would be understood that the Government of the Arab Union recognizes all the existing oil concessions on their current terms. As regards the region being invested by the oil companies and what financial arrangements have ensued between different parties it would remain as it is except for the necessary financial needs of the Union Government."

The note expressed the hope that the British Government would be able to advise the Sheikh of Kuwait on choosing what is best for him of the two solutions and with all possible speed. If he chooses the first solution, then there remains a necessity for discussing the boundary matter, and if he chooses the second solution, which deals with boundaries, then the Government of the Arab Union would be prepared to sign a treaty of friendship and good-neighbourliness with him.

The note represented the last position of the monarchy regime that ruled Iraq after the establishment of the modern State of Iraq until the 14 July 1958 revolution took place. That regime was known to be one among the staunchest allies of the West. The Iraqi Government and the Government of the Arab Union became firmly convinced that Britain was behind the obstacles preventing the achievement of this objective. This generated tension in Iraqi-British relations and led Iraq to intensify its efforts and pressure upon Britain. The Iraqi Government prepared an official note bolstered by documented evidence which supports the necessity of Kuwait's entry into the Arab Union. It was decided to publish this note on 12 July 1958, but the British Ambassador requested the postponement of the publication and conveyed to the Arab Union's Foreign Minister, Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, Britain's initial acceptance of the idea of Kuwait's accession to the Arab Union provided that the details of the matter be discussed at a meeting which was set to be held on 24 July 1958 in London between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of the Arab Union on the one side, and their British counterparts on the other. However, the 14 July 1958 revolution in Iraq prevented such a meeting.

In 1961, Britain decided to grant Kuwait "independence", a decision which prompted the then Prime Minister of Iraq to declare, in a press conference on 25 June 1961, that Iraq considered Kuwait an integral part of its territory and that Iraq did not recognize the special relationship agreement between Britain and Kuwait which the Sheikh of Kuwait, Abdullah al-Salim al-Sabah, had signed with Colonel M. J. Meade, the British Political Resident in the Gulf, on 19 June 1961. Following that declaration, Britain deployed its armed forces to confront Iraq.

Because of the mistake made by Iraq's Foreign Minister at the time, Hashim Jawad, when he withdrew, in angry protest, from the meeting of the Arab League Council, the chance arose to make Kuwait a member of the League, because the decision to admit a new member to the Arab League must win the unanimous approval of the members.

The Iraqi Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 21 July 1961, declaring that the Arab League's decision No. 35-1777, accepting Kuwait as a member of the League of Arab States, to be a flagrant "violation" of the League's Charter, which stipulated unanimity. Iraq also declared the said decision to be null and void and its belief that Kuwait would remain an integral part of its territory and that Iraq would seek to restore this part by all legitimate means.

The Government of the Kuwaiti regime failed in more than one attempt to join the United Nations between 1961 and late 1963.

Following the downfall of the political regime which ruled Iraq between July 1958 and February 1963, the Prime Minister of the Government of Kuwait, in late 1963, visited Baghdad in circumstances of political confusion and instability in Iraq. A joint communiqué was issued referring to the correspondence of 1932. However, the National Revolution Command Council, the highest Iraqi legislative authority according to the interim Constitution of 1963, did not ratify the said communiqué.

This historical review shows that all the successive Governments of Iraq were never convinced of severing any part from the land of Iraq and had not signed a border treaty. No constitutional law in Iraq describing this border has ever been promulgated.

Such was the situation prevailing by the time of the Revolution of 17 to 30 July 1968. The revolutionary Government has been keen, under instruction from President Saddam Hussein, to settle this problem in a manner that would secure for Iraq a reasonable measure of its historical rights and remove at least a limited part of the injustice done to it since the beginning of this century.

During the 1970s, Iraq was the party that took the initiative in approaching the rulers of Kuwait to find such a settlement. But those rulers, encouraged by their foreign allies, insisted that Iraq accept the measures imposed by the British colonialists. The Foreign Minister of Iraq visited

Kuwait City in 1972 and 1973 to discuss this issue. The Interior Minister, too, visited Kuwait City for the same purpose on 16 May 1978. Several committees were formed without achieving any result.

This chapter on the discussions of this issue was put aside following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. Immediately after the liberation of Fao, and while attending the Algiers Summit, the Iraqi Foreign Minister took the initiative in informing the Foreign Minister of Kuwait of Iraq's genuine desire to settle this issue. What raised astonishment was that the regime in Kuwait did not respond promptly to this desire and did not reply to the offer of Iraq until the beginning of July 1988, when the Foreign Minister of Kuwait visited Iraq and it was agreed that the subject be discussed by the two Foreign Ministers.

The talks between the two Ministers were delayed owing to the start of the Iraqi-Iranian negotiations and the preoccupation of Iraq's Foreign Minister with them. It was decided to send the Vice-Chairman of the Revolution Command Council to Kuwait City on 6 December 1988 to urge the authority there to resume discussing the matter. It was agreed that the Vice-Chairman of the Revolution Command Council from the Iraqi side and the Crown Prince from their side would discuss the subject.

The visit of the Vice-Chairman of the Revolution Command Council was returned by Saad al-Abdullah's visit to Baghdad on 6 February 1989. It was clear that he was not prepared to consider even the simple and minimum of Iraq's legitimate demands.

On 27 March 1989, Minister Saud al-Usaimi made a visit to Baghdad, during which he officially asked that the talks on this issue be postponed. During the visit made by the Sheikh of Kuwait to Baghdad in September 1989, President Saddam Hussein proposed to him once again the resumption of talks on the issue. It was agreed to pursue the matter between Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Saadoun Hammadi on the Iraqi side and their Foreign Minister on the Kuwaiti side. Dr. Saadoun Hammadi did actually visit Kuwait City on 19 November 1989 to discuss the matter. Their former Foreign Minister did not return that visit until February 1990.

It ought to be mentioned here that the former Sheikhs of Kuwait took advantage of the situation during the entire period while the settlement of this issue remained pending. They also exploited Iraq's internal and regional preoccupations, the last of which being the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted eight years. They exploited it to consolidate their territorial encroachment northwards by the establishment of police posts, military installations, farms and oil installations. In 1963, for instance, the checkpoint for crossing from Kuwait to Basrah was at al-Mitla'a, where passports were stamped for departure. We enclose some photocopies of them. But this checkpoint was moved more than 70 kilometres to the north in order to press a fait accompli upon Iraq which was preoccupied during the said period with its internal affairs and the region's problems.

The historical and geographical facts which I have elucidated above indicate in an irrefutable manner that Iraq did not accept, at any past time, any formula for the delimitation of the boundary and did not agree to any interpretation of it or any manner of its demarcation. This position was not spontaneous because it rests upon a factual reality which states that the boundary delimitation formula and its British interpretations and the British endeavours aiming at the demarcation of the boundaries as based upon them usurp Iraq's territorial rights and its legitimate interests, such rights and interests that are in perfect harmony with the facts of history and geography. This factual reality explains the uniformity of the Iraqi position throughout the different political regimes in Iraq and all of the successive Governments, a position which had stayed as it is without change. Thus, the Commission decisions that came in the course of imposing the boundary issue upon Iraq from the beginning in a predetermined course are baseless and bear no evidence.

Following this review of the facts of history and geography, it becomes unequivocally clear to every impartial observer that the decisions adopted by the Commission during its New York session from 8 to 16 April 1992 represent a purely political decision imposed by the Powers dominating the Security Council at present, particularly the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.

The political objective of this decision is clearly not only to deny Iraq its historical territorial rights and undermine its vital interests, but also deliberately to create an illegal and illogical situation which arouses the indignation, and threatens the interests, of an ancient people whose predicament has been imposed upon it by armed force and political blackmail. The objective is also to create a climate of dissatisfaction, dissent and instability in the whole region.

It is this kind of climate which the decision makers (the United States and the United Kingdom), want to preserve in the region as a whole, in order to justify the perpetuation of their military bases and of the presence of their armed forces in a state of occupation which will enable them to continue extorting the ruling regimes in Kuwait and the region and pillaging the oil wealth of the area.

Any ratification by the Security Council of this unjust decision, which has been deliberately directed by two of its permanent members, will constitute a very dangerous precedent, contrary in substance and consequences to the duties and responsibilities entrusted to the Council by the Charter of the United Nations. Once the Security Council has ratified this decision, it will not have contributed to the preservation of security and stability in the region but will rather have consciously created a continuous hotbed of tension as well as deliberately violated the legitimate and vital interests of a State Member of the United Nations. If there were compelling circumstances which force the Iraqi authorities to take certain positions regarding this decision, the people of Iraq could never be convinced that its historical rights had been respected and its vital interests safeguarded by the Security Council in

a manner compatible with the rules of international law and the criteria of justice and fairness. The Arab Nation will continue to view this decision as one link in the chain of Western imperialist games which began after the First World War and which have always been the subject of indignation and rejection on the part of the Arab Nation, and which have caused many of the disturbances and changes witnessed in the Arab Nation. The situation which we witness today is not new to the world, and the world knows the outcome resulting from such instances.

In bringing this letter to an end, I would like to recall that this conclusion is not ours alone, but it is also shared by many fair-minded people in the region and the world at large.

Allow me at this point to draw your attention to some of the views on the subject published in the Arab and foreign press:

In an article by Caryle Murphy published by The Washington Post on 5 May 1992, one official was reported to have said:

> "I think that's something Kuwait should consider if it wants a boundary for keeps. Both parties can still agree on another line for other reasons."

The writer quotes Mr. Fred Halliday, an expert in international relations at the London School of Economics, as saying in regard to the situation as it now stands:

> "We have the seeds of another war. I can't see any way that any Iraqi Government would support this demarcation."

The article quotes also Mr. Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, the Chairman of the Commission, as saying:

> "The task given to us, according to the resolution, says demarcation, not delimitation ... only countries can delimit boundaries."

The article noted that:

> "Even early documents show that this border has never been a pacific one."

It reported Mr. Ian Brook a member of the Commission to have said:

> "Some of the most acrimonious discussions have been between British and British", referring to letters exchanged when Kuwait was administered from Britain's India Office and Iraq was under the Colonial Office."

In an article entitled "The Umm Qasr time bomb", written by G. H. Jansen in Middle East International and published on 6 March 1992, the following was stated:

"The UN Commission's giving Umm Qasr to Kuwait can only be explained as a further example of America's punitive campaign against Iraq and already US officials are reported as saying that they will insist that the new boundary be respected as Iraq's southern border."

The writer adds:

"The UN has produced a time bomb which only the Security Council can defuse, by basing itself on natural justice and rejecting the Commission's findings when they are submitted in April."

In an article published by the Wall Street Journal on 5 December 1991, entitled "The UN hires a sleuth to find border between Iraq and Kuwait", which presented a somewhat detailed account on the role of the British expert and of the representative of Kuwait investigating the point at Safwan, the following was said:

"But some experts warn that such an adjustment - which Iraq, with only one vote on the Commission, can't prevent - could sow the seeds for future conflict."

The article quotes Mr. Richard Schofield, Deputy Director of the Geopolitics and International Boundaries Research Centre in London as saying:

"The age-old problem of Iraqi access to the Gulf remains. Iraq never felt able to live with this, and may not in the future."

The Financial Times concluded an article published on 19 February 1992 as follows:

"Common borders are finally a matter of bilateral consent between neighbouring countries but US officials say they will insist the new boundary be respected as Iraq's southern border."

Under the title "The new outline of the frontier between Iraq and Kuwait raises serious problems" Le Monde on 21 April 1992 stated that:

"Situated at the mouth of Khowr Zhobeir at the north-west extremity of the Gulf, the Umm Qasr port and naval base, today threatened, are only part of the gigantic complex built 20 years ago by Iraq in this area vital for its development: petrochemical, steel, gas liquefaction and fertilizer plants, and dry docks for the repair of vessels. The water channels leading to the Gulf were dredged in 1990 in order to permit the entry of larger tankers. All this area has become a priority after the cease-fire with Iran because it constitutes an alternative to Basrah on the Shatt al-Arab, which is filled with wreckage and falls within the range of Iranian fire. The new line of the frontier is in danger of reducing these enormous investments to nothing."

The newspaper adds:

> "But voices are being raised to the effect that, apart from the technical work of the Commission, political considerations and commonsense should be taken into account so as to ensure respect for the interests of the two countries and to avoid future conflicts."

In an article published in the Jordanian daily Al-Ra'i on 19 April 1992, Mr. Tariq Msarwa wrote the following:

> "During the recent meeting of the Committee for the demarcation of the Iraq-Kuwait boundary line the Commission "discovered" that parts of the land of the Iraqi side (the whole of the Rumaila oilfield and three quarters of the port of Umm Qasr, Iraq's single port on the Gulf which was developed at huge cost) belong to Kuwait!!! The objective of the Commission is no different from the objective the British assigned to themselves - the task of speaking for all concerned at al-Eqair negotiations and "agreed with themselves" to isolate Iraq. Otherwise, why was the uninhabited island of Bubiyan given to Kuwait at a time when the whole population of Kuwait was less than 10,000? What is important now is that the boundary line between Iraq and Kuwait is being determined by a United Nations Commission which knows that both the scope and outcome of its work are predetermined by the United States and Britain. If the objective of the Eqair negotiations in the 1920s was to isolate Iraq from the world, what is being done now is to plant the seeds of ongoing Iraqi-Kuwaiti enmity regardless of whether the political system on either side remains or changes!!!"

In an article published on 19 April 1992, in the Jordanian daily Al-Distour, Mr. Mohammed Daoudiyah stated that:

> "Encroaching upon the territory of Iraq means very simply planting highly volatile explosives in inter-Arab relations and closing the door before all reason and wisdom."

Mr. Dawoodiyah wonders:

> "How can any Iraqi overlook this flagrant violation of his or her country's territory, or remain indifferent while Iraqi life is being denied all access to the Arabian Gulf?"

In an article entitled: "Beware the seditious work of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission", the Jordanian daily Sawt al-Shaab wrote on 19 April 1992 the following:

> "It seems that the United States of America and its allies are bent on planting inter-Arab division and conflict, and remain determined to create pretexts, motives and justifications for the eruption of self-destructive regional wars which will render all parties involved military and economically worn-out and politically vulnerable, a state of

affairs ripe at all times for American and Western intervention to settle the disputes at hand. Otherwise, what is the meaning of the decision taken by the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission to bestow upon Kuwait part of the Iraqi port city of Umm Qasr and push about 200 kilometres of the boundary line 600 metres inside Iraq to the benefit of Kuwait?"

The article goes on to say that:

"To take advantage of Iraq's difficult circumstances in order to violate its right to sovereignty and territorial integrity or usurp part of its land with the help of the enemies of Iraq and the Arab nation is like playing with fire, and may be even far more dangerous than that. So, beware the sedition planted by the enemies of our nation in order to stir wars amongst brothers."

In a news analysis by Dr. Saad Aboudiyah published in Al-Shaab of Jordan on 21 April 1992, the writer wrote:

"In my view, as long as these allocations remain unacceptable to either party, they will continue to constitute the time bomb they have always been."

Dr. Aboudiyah also said:

"In brief, the Commission, by taking the decision it has taken, has in fact contributed to rekindling the flames of conflict anew. The people of Iraq will continue to feel the grave injustice done to them in the boundary demarcation issue."

In an article entitled "Inter-Arab boundaries set ablaze ... Why now?", published in the Al-Distour daily of Jordan, Dr. Nabeel Al-Shareef wrote, on 21 April 1992:

"Let's begin with the Iraq-Kuwait boundary demarcation question which has been determined in a manner which makes it ready to explode at any time in the future. It is illogical to bestow Iraqi territory upon Kuwait and deny Iraq all access to the sea; and those who have accepted this iniquitous demarcation of the boundary line have in fact done nothing to help in any way to resolve the boundary issue between the two countries. Indeed, all they have done is to leave this issue unresolved, fraught with bitterness and ready to explode and unleash its bloody outcome. They would have much better evinced the far-sightedness which would assure the coming Arab generations the right climate of security, brotherliness and good-neighbourliness. Iraq, whose name runs back to the deep roots of human history and which has stamped its mark on geography, will never disappear from the map. The presence of foreign forces in this region cannot be eternal, in spite of the success achieved in this particular instance by the tendency to enflame inter-Arab boundary disputes."

The writer sums up by saying:

> "The Arab borders have not blazed suddenly with no reasons behind it, but rather to perpetuate the frazzled Arab state of affairs and augment the already existing atmosphere of panic to impel others to stick the American Grand Protector, especially that those borders that were set ablaze exist in the Gulf and Jazirah area, an oil region which the United States of America needs today and will continue to need tomorrow."

In a report published in the Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper on 21 April 1992, a diplomat is quoted as saying:

> "There is nothing the Iraqis can do in the short term other than complain. But this will pose a permanent danger, a time bomb, to the long-term relations between the two countries, a danger that will persist."

In Al-Ahram al-Dawli of 22 April 1992, Mr. Mohammed Othman started his daily column, entitled "Hatha-assabah (This morning)", by saying:

> "The new borders between Iraq and Kuwait that have been demarcated lately can be nothing other than a time bomb waiting to be exploded at any moment, sooner or later."

The Jordanian Akhbar al-Asbou' daily of 23 April 1992 addressed the border dispute in the Arab Jazirah and the Arabian Gulf, referring to it as:

> "A tribal inheritance nourished by the oil boom and petro-dollar wealth, perpetuated by the foreign companies which were backed by the British colonial occupations that were imposed throughout the Jazirah and the coastal strip along both sides of the Gulf reaching Iraq following its occupation in early twentieth century."

The newspaper added:

> "Britain, as protector country, felt that it would be difficult to bring those tribes under control. Therefore it resorted to the scheme of containing those tribes within entities among which it sowed the seeds of fear with a view to facilitating their control. In addition, it made open maps available to those tribes to serve as an element of demolition of any future national unity."

The paper concluded by saying:

> "This agonizing state of affairs is being experienced in the Arab Jazirah. The most prominent event of it is perhaps what is being done on the Iraq-Kuwait boundary question, in which the United Nations intervened to usurp Iraq's Rumaila oil field and the port of Umm Qasr according to British maps, in a move to further debilitate Iraq and consequently ignite further eruptions in the area."

In a piece entitled: "By relying on British maps, the United Nations Commission adopts a resolution to divide the Arabian Gulf", Al-Ra'i newspaper of Jordan wrote on 24 April 1992:

> "This is not the first time for the United Nations to use British maps to destroy existing political entities and divide the people who have struggled to maintain their national unity and preserve their pan-Arab character."

Having touched on the issue of Palestine, the paper went on to write the following on the issue of the Iraq-Kuwait borders:

> "The decision adopted by the United Nations Commission on the demarcation of the boundary line between Iraq and Kuwait will leave both sides for many generations to come, and with the blessings of the United Nations, engaged in an endless fight and in a state of permanent enmity, especially in view of the fact that Umm Qasr and the Rumaila oilfield have both always been part of Iraq since the day it bore its name and long before the arrival of any British colonialist in the Gulf region. The British policy of "divide and rule" is not new to Britain and its maps. For this policy has been implemented for dozens of years in our Arab land. But when such a policy marches to the United Nations and finds its way to UN practice, then we begin to realize the potential dangers of this international Organization which has actually become the "Organization of the American nations".

Mr. Abdul Latif Al-Furati, Editor-in-Chief of the Tunisian Al-Sabah daily, wrote in an editorial article on 26 April 1992:

> "It is imperative that a stand of rejection emerge on the Iraq-Kuwait border demarcation issue, since boundary lines cannot be forcefully imposed upon one party or the other without the consent of the two sides concerned. Otherwise, any boundary delimitation carried out against the will of any of the two countries will become a time bomb which may explode at any moment. Furthermore, any agreement reached must be based on justice and on the history of the situation."

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Enclosure

Photocopies of passports stamped for departure at al-Mitla'a

K H J ..... ☎001

BEARER OF PASSPORT — حامل جواز السفر

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| Profession — المهنة | [illegible] |
| Place and date of birth — محل الميلاد وتاريخه | الكويت ١٩٤٤ |
| Domicile — محل الاقامة الدائمي | ح |
| Height — الطول | ١ متر ٧٥ سنتيمتر (cm. / m.) |
| Colour of eyes — لون العينين | سوداء |
| Colour of hair — لون الشعر | اسود |
| Distinguishing marks — العلامات الفارقة | لا يوجد |

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الاوصاف — DESCRIPTION

WIFE — الزوجة

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| Profession — المهنة | |
| Place and date of birth — محل الميلاد وتاريخه | |
| Domicile — محل الاقامة الدائمي | |
| Height — الطول | متر (m.) سنتيمتر (cm.) |
| Colour of eyes — لون العينين | |
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| Distinguishing marks — العلامات الفارقة | |

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| لون الشعر Colour of hair | |
| العلامات الفارقة Distinguishing marks | |

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REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

الجمهورية العراقية

PASSPORT

جواز سفر

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| اسم حامله Name of bearer | ضرية ياسين ذهب |
| اسم زوجته Wife's name | |
| عدد الاولاد No. of Children | واحد One |
| الجنسية Nationality | عراقية |

PASSPORT

جواز سفر

In the name of the Minister for Foreign Affairs

GREETINGS;

All competent authorities are requested to accord bearer of this passport protection, to allow him passage and to afford him all possible assistance in case of need.

باسم وزير خارجية

الى يحيى من يهمه

الامر ونرجو ان يشملوا حامل

هذا الجواز برعايتهم ، وان

يسمحوا له بالمرور ، وان

يقدموا له جميع المساعدات

الممكنة عند الاقتضاء .

Given at ..... صدر في البصرة

the ..... اليوم الثالث العشرين

of .....19 ١٩٦١ من شباط

Passport Officer. مأمور الجوازات

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





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1—RENEWALS ١ــ التمديدات

PASSPORT OFFICE مكتب الجوازات

Baghdad في بغداد 7/11/62

No.5189 D.. ٦٢/١١/٧ الرقم ٥١٨٩ تاريخ

This passport is ...by هذا الجواز ... بمدت مدة الـ...

renewed valid until: 22/4/1963 ٢٢/٤/١٩٦٣

A. Rich ...
Passport Officer ضابط الجوازات

٧

وافقت مديرية السفر والجنسية على سفر حامله
بكتابها المرقم ١١٨٠٢ والمؤرخ في ٤/١١/٦٢

بغداد في ٧/١١/١٩٦٢ ضابط السفر

OBSERVATIONS الملحوظات

وافق الحاكم العسكري العام بكتابه ٤٧٤٨ ل ٧/١١/١٩٦٢
على سفر ... خبرة ... صلف
وا... حسن عبدا... لمدة شهر واحد
تاريخ ... ٧/١١/١٩٦٢

ضابط الجوازات ...

اضيف الطفل حسن عبدالله ...
مواليد عام ١٩٦٠ الى هذا الجواز

ضابط سفر بغداد
٧/١١/١٩٦٢

VISAS
21/05 '92 21:20 ☎616761
VISAS
K H J



الاقطار التى يجوز الدخول
اليها بهذا الجواز
Countries for which
this passport is valid
All Arab Countries
الدول العربية

ينتهى العمل بهذا الجواز فى
The validity of this Passport
expires on
٢٢ نيسان ١٩٦١

الا اذا جدد
unless renewed

صدر فى القاهرة
Issued at

التاريخ
Date
١٩٦١ نيسان ٢٢

التصوير الشمسى
حامل الجواز BEARER

توقيع حامله
Signature of bearer

توقيع الزوجة
Signature of wife

21/05 '92 21:21 ☎616761

This Passport contains 48 Pages

يحتوى هذا الجواز
على (٤٨) صحيفة

REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

الجمهورية العراقية

# PASSPORT

# جواز سفر

173876 ع/ ١٧٣٨٧٦ رقم جواز السفر — No. of Passport

زكية الحاج حلوان كروف اسم حامله — Name of bearer

اسم زوجته — Wife's name

عدد الاولاد — No. of Children

عراقية الجنسية — Nationality

K H J 003

REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

الجمهورية العراقية

# PASSPORT

# جواز سفر

—o—

—o—

In the name of the Minister for Foreign Affairs

GREETINGS;

All competent authorities are requested to accord bearer of this passport protection, to allow him passage and to afford him all possible assistance in case of need.

باسم وزير خارجية العراق نحيي من يهمهم الامر ونرجو ان يشملوا حامل هذا الجواز برعايتهم وان يسمحوا له بالمرور وان يقدموا له جميع المساعدات الممكنة عند الاقتضاء.

Given at ..... صدر في

the 26 ..... في اليوم السادس والعشرين

of ..... من شهر ..... ١٩٦٢

Passport Officer. ضابط الجوازات

S/24044
English
Page 33

004 التصوير الشمسي PHOTOGRAPH K H J

حامل الجواز BEARER الزوجة WIFE

حامله
Signature of

توقيع الزوجة
Signature of wife



21/05 '92 21:23 ☎616761

| Countries for which this passport is valid | الاقطار التى يجوز الدخول اليها بهذا الجواز |
|---|---|
| | الاردن ايران الكويت والعربيه السعوديه |

The validity of this Passport expires on ينتهى العمل بهذا الجواز فى ٢٥/٢/١٩٩٥

unless renewed الا اذا جدد

Issued at صدر فى

Date التاريخ

/...

005
21/05 '92 21:24 616761
I—RENEWALS
K H J
OBSERVATIONS

/...

006
تأشيرات التجديد
K H J
1—RENEWALS
21/05 '92 21:26 616761
VISAS
التأشيرات

/...


VISAS
التاشيرات
مديرية الشرطة والأمن العام
مركز الاطلاع - كويت
26 مايو 1991
Public
Visas
48 hours


21/05 '92 21:29 ☎616761
VISAS
التأشيرات
سجل بتاريخ ٢٧ نيسان ١٩٦٤
VISAS
التأشيرات
خروج
ضابط الجوازات
هو دخل في الاشكول
عن طريق جواز سفر
التأشيرة
ضابط جوازات مطار

REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

الجمهورية العراقية

# PASSPORT

# جواز سفر

In the name of the Minister for Foreign Affairs

GREETINGS;

All competent authorities are requested to accord bearer of this passport protection, to allow him passage and to afford him all possible assistance in case of need.

باسم وزير خارجية العراق نحيي من يهمهم الامر ونرجو أن يشملوا حامل هذا الجواز برعايتهم ، وان يسمحوا له بالمرور ، وان يقدموا له جميع المساعدات الممكنة عند الاقتضاء .

Given at ..... .....

the .....

of .....19

صدر في البصرة

في اليوم الحادي عشر

من شهر شباط ١٩٦١

Passport Officer.

ضابط الجوازات

عبد السميع خليل

003

K H J
1

21/05 '92 21:40 ☎616761

5

| Countries for which this passport is valid | الاقطار التى يجوز الدخول اليها بهذا الجواز |
|---|---|
| | الكويت |

PHOTOGRAPH التصوير الشمسى

BEARER حامل الجواز WIFE الزوجة

توقيع حامله
Signature of bearer

توقيع الزوجة
Signature of wife

The validity of this Passport expires on : ينتهى العمل بهذا الجواز فى :

unless renewed الا اذا جدد

Issued at صدر فى البصره

Date التاريخ

/...

11 ١١

VISAS التأشيرات




10 ١٠

4—RENEWALS ٤ — التمديدات



12 ١٢

VISAS التأشيرات

18 ١٣

VISAS التأشيرات

005 K H J

VISAS التأشيرات



21/05 '92 21:45 ☎616761 ١٥

VISAS التأشيرات

/...


VISAS
التأشيرات
شوهد في الدخول
شوهد في الخروج